Thirty-six years in the Middle East

The campaign in six turns

This is the broad map. The dates are useful dividing lines, not walls: basing, naval patrols, intelligence work, and smaller operations overlapped the named campaigns.

1990–1991: a clear objective, then a harder question

On 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait. President George H. W. Bush ordered American forces to Saudi Arabia under Operation Desert Shield while the United States assembled a multinational coalition. The immediate problem was whether Iraqi forces would go farther. The political objective that followed was specific: drive them from Kuwait. A UN-backed coalition gave the campaign wider legitimacy and forces that no U.S.-only account should erase.

Operation Desert Storm opened with an air campaign on 17 January 1991. Coalition forces attacked Iraqi command systems, air defenses, supply, and fielded formations. The ground offensive began on 24 February. Forces entered Kuwait while a major coalition thrust in the west struck Iraqi formations in and near southern Iraq. Kuwait was liberated; the ground campaign ended after about one hundred hours. General Norman Schwarzkopf directed the coalition campaign, but its outcome depended on many national contingents and months of preparation.

The choice to stop mattered as much as the breakthrough. The mandate was to expel Iraq from Kuwait, not occupy Baghdad. Iraqi forces were badly damaged, yet Saddam remained in power. In the aftermath, Kurdish and Shiite uprisings, Iraqi repression, refugees, and relief operations made the human cost of that boundary painfully visible. A game that awards victory merely for taking Kuwait catches the military result and misses the next decision.

1991–2002: containment was an operation too

For more than a decade, American and allied forces maintained a military presence around Iraq. Southern Watch and Northern Watch enforced no-fly zones. Aircraft and ships patrolled, deployed, and sometimes fought Iraqi air defenses. The United States also struck Iraq in episodes including the four-day Operation Desert Fox in December 1998. This was neither a fresh invasion nor an absence of combat.

Containment posed a political bargain: keep Iraqi power constrained without paying the cost of occupation. It also required bases, partners, repeated deployments, and an explanation of what would end the mission. For a game, that creates a very different problem from Desert Storm. The player must sustain access and deterrence over time while incidents threaten escalation. One sortie is the easy part; doing it for years is where the bill arrives.

2003–2011: winning the invasion, losing the easy ending

President George W. Bush’s administration chose to overthrow Saddam’s government in 2003, citing alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction among its principal arguments. Coalition forces invaded in March and entered Baghdad in April. The regime fell quickly. The large stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction advanced in the prewar case were not found. That fact has to remain in the story, because a false premise changes how we judge the decision to begin a war.

The next phase did not resemble the invasion. State institutions fractured, weapons and munitions sites were left insecure, insurgent organizations grew, and sectarian conflict intensified. American troops and Iraqi civilians bore the costs. The 2007–2008 surge increased U.S. forces and changed their deployment and counterinsurgency approach, while Iraqi politics, Sunni tribal opposition to al-Qaeda in Iraq, and other local choices also shaped the reduction in violence. No single switch produced it.

Under a bilateral status-of-forces agreement, U.S. forces withdrew by the end of 2011. The military could remove a regime faster than it could build a political order accepted by its people. If a game ends when the capital falls, it will call the invasion a complete victory at precisely the moment the next contest begins.

2014–2022: the fight against ISIS

ISIS seized extensive territory in Iraq and Syria in 2014 and declared a “caliphate.” The United States returned to military operations in Iraq and began strikes in Syria. Operation Inherent Resolve combined coalition airpower, intelligence, training, advisers, and special operations with Iraqi forces and, in Syria, local partners including the Syrian Democratic Forces. The partners did much of the ground fighting. Their aims, vulnerabilities, and political futures were their own.

ISIS lost its final territorial foothold in Syria in March 2019. That was a major military result, not proof that its cells, grievances, and recruiting networks had disappeared. In Iraq, the coalition’s combat role transitioned to advising, assisting, and enabling by the end of 2021. A 2020 U.S. strike in Baghdad killed Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani, showing how the anti-ISIS mission sat alongside a dangerous contest with Iran and Iran-linked armed groups. In 2022 and after, “mission accomplished” remained a poor substitute for asking what local forces could hold.

2023–2026: ships, missiles, and direct war with Iran

After attacks on shipping in the Red Sea region, U.S. and allied naval forces mounted Operation Prosperity Guardian from late 2023 to protect maritime traffic. Ships intercepted missiles and drones; the United States and partners also struck Houthi targets in Yemen. In 2025, Operation Rough Rider became a sustained American strike campaign against the Houthis. Neither convoy defense nor bombing alone could settle Yemen’s political conflict.

On 21 June 2025 (22 June in Iran), U.S. forces conducted Operation Midnight Hammer against Iranian nuclear facilities. The Pentagon described its immediate strike effects as successful; longer-term claims about the nuclear program require separate evidence. Then, on 28 February 2026, CENTCOM announced the start of Operation Epic Fury against Iranian military targets. Its public releases describe further U.S.–Iran strikes and naval encounters into September. The opening strike, stated aims, and reported actions are documented; the ultimate military and political outcome is not.

This last period is still being written. For current operations especially, an official military release establishes what that command says it did and why. It cannot by itself settle civilian effects, enemy losses, legality, or the eventual strategic result. We should resist grading a war while the scorekeeper is still on the field.

Conclusion: the objective is the argument

The United States could assemble overwhelming force in 1991, topple a government in 2003, support partners against ISIS, defend shipping, and strike distant targets. Those are different capabilities, exercised for different ends. The record shows real military successes and real strategic failures; neither cancels the other. The most honest game of these decades asks players to name a limited objective, pay the costs of pursuing it, and then live with the country and region left on the board.

This survey is a starting map, not a substitute for detailed campaign histories. The 2026 section is current only through 27 September 2026 and will need revision as events and independent assessments develop.