As I've expressed multiple times, it's best to ask your questions, air your opinions or make your suggestion in the forum. For whatever reason it isn't happening. But, as I've stated before, I will not answer email. My responses will be in the forum.
I use the same sources that most Napoleonic gamers have had access to, however, now that national archives are more accessible to the public and translation software is readily available, I've been using personal journals, battlefield reports and other such data sources to gather more information.
At some points the regulations (which it seems many books are based on) do coincide with the battlefield reality, mostly they don't. I put together a comparative listing that I use to remind me of the discrepancies that plague some of the histories, especially in battle.
One of the most glaring discrepancies is the number of men that actually made up the various formations and category of troop. Some numbers are based on a full complement, or "paper strength", which is a reflection of the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). However, this was hardly ever the base facts, as constant marching and battle invited attrition (loses, desertions, sickness, etc.) and the lack of readily available resources to replenish from, kept the actual numbers lower than what the TO&E indicated. Below is a table I use that has helped me design the rules for OMNB (Data in the tables below, are based on cross-referenced sources including Nafziger, Elting, Digby Smith, translated reports of the period, and period military regulations).
Napoleonic Battalion Strengths – Full vs Field
Nation | Unit Type | Full Complement | Typical Field Strength | Bayonet Strength | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
France | Line Battalion (1805) | 840 | 550–650 | 450–550 | 6 companies; depot staff excluded from field strength. |
France | Line Battalion (1813) | 700–750 | 400–500 | 350–450 | Rebuilt post-1812 with younger conscripts. |
Britain | Line Battalion (1811) | 1,000 | 600–700 | 500–600 | Includes two flank companies; well-supported by regimental system. |
Russia | Line Battalion (1812) | 800 | 500–600 | 400–500 | 3-company structure; often understrength on campaign. |
Russia | Guard Battalion | 820 | 600–700 | 500–600 | Maintained closer to full complement. |
Austria | Fusilier Battalion (1809) | 800 | 500–600 | 400–500 | Part of brigade-structured regiments; variable recruitment. |
Prussia | Musketeer Battalion (1806) | 800 | 450–550 | 350–450 | 4-company structure; provincial variation in readiness. |
Prussia | Line Battalion (1813–15) | 700–800 | 500–600 | 400–500 | Reformed army; supported by Landwehr and conscription improvements. |
Regulations vs Reality – Napoleonic Tactical Comparison
Topic | Regulations (Imperial Bayonets) | Battlefield Reality (Campaign Accounts) |
---|---|---|
*Infantry Line Formation | Preferred formation for delivering volleys; 2–3 ranks deep; ideal for firepower. | Rarely maintained in sustained combat. Terrain, fatigue, and enemy pressure often broke lines into uneven blobs. |
*Infantry Column | Used for rapid movement; assault columns to close with the enemy and deploy into line before firing. | Often engaged in column due to pressure or confusion. Devastating against weak morale units but vulnerable to volley fire. |
*Artillery Placement | Batteries placed with clear arcs between brigades or on hills; spacing and coverage were precise. | Terrain and urgency forced suboptimal placement. Some batteries had limited effectiveness or narrow fields of fire. |
*Cavalry Charges | Used for decisive shock; reform required post-charge; pursuit limited unless ordered. | Often launched prematurely; pursuit frequently spontaneous; reforming mid-battle rare. |
*Skirmishers | Deployed forward in pairs to harass and screen. | Crucial in broken terrain; sometimes operated independently. Overused by French in Spain. |
*Volley Fire | Controlled volleys by file or rank at effective range; officers strictly regulated fire discipline. | Fire control broke down under stress; smoke and adrenaline led to premature or misdirected volleys. |
*Square Formation | Rapid formation against cavalry; rear ranks also fired; highly effective if properly executed. | Very effective when formed in time. Raw or fatigued troops often failed to form and broke under pressure. |
*Morale & Cohesion | Maintained through drill, hierarchy, and national pride (esprit de corps). | Highly unstable. Cohesion degraded rapidly under fire, fatigue, and poor visibility. |
*Use of Reserves | Reserves held for decisive interventions or counterattacks. | Often committed piecemeal due to confusion, pressure, or breakdowns in command. |